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Robert M. Covert
We have become so transfixed by the achievement of James Win.
Moore and his colleagues in creating, nurturing, expounding and an-
notating a great trans-substantive code of procedure that we often
miss the persistent and inevitable tension between procedure general-
ized across substantive lines and procedure applied to implement a
particular substantive end. There are, indeed, trans-substantive values
which may be expressed, and to some extent served, by a code of pro-
cedure. But there are also demands of particular substantive objec-
tives which cannot be served except through the purposeful shaping,
indeed, the manipulation, of process to a case or to an area of law.
What follows is by no means an attempt to denigrate or undermine
the ongoing trans-substantive achievement of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rather it is an exploration to rediscover the feel of
a tension. That this tension has by no means been buried strikes me
as one of the least appreciated dimensions of the achievement of Pro-
fessor Moore. His treatise has kept before the profession a vision of
the Federal Rules as a coherent structure; at the same time it has
embraced the flexibility of application which lets them serve so many
ends. From the outset, Professor Moore's vision of the integrity of
the Federal Rules has struck me as akin to the structure of a coast-
line. Washed by litigation, the line must shift and shape itself to
tides and storms. Viewed from the coastline itself, the shape may seem
to alter dramatically. But from a continental perspective it appears
remarkably stable and coherent. It is to the particularistic interaction
of case and process that I shall address myself. But the choice of that
focus should in no sense be read as a denial of the continental form.
I
Sir Henry Maine's famous observation that "substantive law has at
first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of pro-
cedure,"'1 has been used to justify the notion that substantive crea-
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. H. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1891).
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tivity may rightly or will inevitably emerge from the application of
procedural rubrics by providing that idea with a lineage.2 It is a
strange application; for Maine, and Maitland who quoted him, were
writing of "the infancy of the Courts of Justice. '" 3 Maine explicitly
contrasted the intertwined character of substance and procedure in
the Law of Actions with the "modem" (late 19th century) separation
of procedural or adjective law from matters of substance. And there
is reason to believe that Maine thought of this separation as an "ad-
vance," justly serving as a touchstone distinguishing developed from
primitive legal systems. 4 Maitland's Forms of Action which begins
by quoting Maine ends with praise of the Judicature Acts and their
abolition of the form of action "as a separate thing":
This results in an important improvement in the statements of
the law ... for the attention is freed from the complexity of
conflicting and overlapping systems of precedents and can be
directed to the real problem of what are the rights between man
and man, what is the substantive law.5
Maine and Maitland did not intend a jurisprudential statement
against the viability of a distinction which they applauded, nor did
they intend to state that the interaction they described was character-
istic of anything beyond a distinctly provincial and national juris-
prudence.
But as Maine and Maitland were describing early English law,
Holmes was preparing a jurisprudential attack on the very idea of
separating substance from procedure. Holmes's view of rights as the
"hypostatis of a prophecy" led him to conclude:
But in my old age I become less and less inclined to make much
use of the distinction between primary rights duties and conse-
quences or sanctioning rights or whatever you may call them.
The primary duty is little more than a convenient index to, or
mode of predicting the point of incidence of the public force.6
2. See, e.g., Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action on the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D.
307 (1973).
3. F. MAITLAND, The Forms of Action at Common Law, in EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF
AcTION AT COMMON LAW 295 (1932).
4. H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 389:
The primary distinction between the early and rude, and the modern and refined,
classifications of legal rules, is that the Rules relating to Actions, to pleading and
procedure, fall into a subordinate place and become, as Bentham called them, Ad-
jective Law.
5. F. MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 375.
6. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 20-21 (M. Howe ed. 1961).
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If by "law" one means a prediction as to what the courts will, in fact,
do,7 then adjective law, as much as substantive law, is a ground for
the prediction. To avoid failing in prognostication an "index to, or
mode of predicting the point of incidence of the public force" can
hardly ignore the remedial tools, the permissible grounds for or rules
of inference, or the allocation of handicaps or advantages in the liti-
gation forum. An understanding of all law in terms of predicting
public coercion is useful as a corrective to romantic notions of the
legal order. But it achieves correction through distortion; the lens
flattens all legal rules. Since all categories of relevant rules are po-
tentially predictive, there is some tendency to understard all of them
as properly predictive in the same way. The perhaps naive view of
Maine and Maitland in praising the Judicature Acts was that a neu-
tral, segregated adjective law would render the substantive law the
only proper ground for prediction: Procedure would reflect adjudi-
cative values designed to serve the end of effective fact finding so
that substantive law alone would become predictive of the incidence
of public force.
Professor Hazard has recently taken Maine and Maitland's obser-
vation about the Forms of Action in "the infancy of the Courts of
Justice" and used it as a generalized law of interaction: "Substantive
law is shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities.",, Speaking
of the federal class action rule, Hazard was absolutely right. Federal
Rule 23 presents a procedural possibility which, once present, cannot
help but shape and articulate substantive law. That shaping is as
real if the opportunity is foregone as it is if the possibility is seized.
For a choice to forego is pregnant in a way that doing without can
never be.
The recognition that procedural possibilities may inevitably shape
substance and that the shaping may take forms not wholly or easily
predicted may lead one to the conclusion that rational minds make
procedural choices at least in part with an eye to potential substantive
consequences. Willful manipulation of procedural components be-
comes one, perhaps necessary, dimension of clear-eyed lawmaking.
Direction is better than the centuries of indirection described by
Maitland.
It must be noted that the generalities of Maine, Maitland and
Hazard are consistent with more particular observations scholars have
made about the ways in which various elements of procedure are ac-
7. O.V. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1897).
8. Hazard, supra note 2, at 307.
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tually used. Judge Charles Clark, writing of code pleading, observed
that particular rules governing pleading of disfavored actions or de-
fenses should be viewed as handicaps assessed in order to effectuate
certain substantive goals. 9 Similar observations have been tentatively
advanced about the pleading of some actions under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.'0 The justifications for presumptions and alloca-
tions of burdens have uniformly included substantive preferences.1"
And one might easily consider the vast literature on substance-pro-
cedure characterization in conflict of laws and in the Erie cases as a
recognition of the substance-oriented manipulation of procedural com-
ponents.12 For it is partly because we understand that substantive-
oriented manipulation of procedural rubrics fits the Holmesian con-
tinuum of grounds for prophecies that we are troubled by the use of
the "procedure" characterization as a sufficient touchstone for deci-
sions that allocate the power to make law.
II
I accept the conclusion that procedure, broadly conceived, will in-
evitably shape substance; but I shall argue that there are proper and
improper ways of structuring process with substantive ends in mind.
I have used the word "proper" advisedly, since it is broad enough to
encompass grounds of evaluation ranging from constitutionality to
elegance. I shall begin with a series of cases that illustrate the range
of relationship between substance and procedure; in so doing I shall
appeal to a professional intuition about the propriety of the various
interactions. My argument consists of an appeal to intuition rather
than to deduction from accepted principles.
Before proceeding to describe and explore this series of intuitions,
however, let me justify one aspect of the terminology which follows.
I shall speak of "procedural" as opposed to "substantive" rules, poli-
cies, principles, preferences or values. The distinction I have in mind
9. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 609-10 (2d ed. 1947).
10. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 217, 224 (1972). It is
noteworthy, and not, I think, coincidental, that Professor Moore's treatise does not con-
cede a different pleading standard for different sorts of actions. The case law is hardly
compelling, and it seems a place for the decision to be put in the hands of the treatise
author. Compare id. with 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fI 18.17[l], at 1725 (2d ed. 1974).
11. See, e.g., James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 58-63 (1961).
12. For the latest round on Erie and the uses of procedure, see Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974); Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erie:
The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1974); Ely, Some Further Last Words on Erie:
The Necklace, 87 HARv. L. REv. 753 (1974). The classic on the significance of the distinc-
tion for conflict of laws remains: Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933), reprinted in W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAws 154-83 (1942) (with addendum at 183-93).
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is the familiar one between that which controls the conduct of liti-
gation and that which controls social conduct outside the courtroom.
I am well aware of Walter Wheeler Cook's caveat with respect to
such categorization:
If.... we examine into the distinction between "substantive law"
and "remedial and procedural law" as that distinction is involved
in legal problems, we find that this distinction is drawn for a num-
ber of different purposes, each involving its own social, economic
or political problems. 13
Cook lists eight such distinct purposes. He argues that whenever a legal
consequence flows from a characterization, we are involved not in the
discovery of a line, but in the drawing of one. There is no reason to
draw the line in the same place for all purposes.14 Yet, in citing
Cook's well-known strictures on the dangers of categorization, one
should remember his own fierce traverse of the accusation that he
attacked generalizations or categories as such. He conceded, indeed
affirmed, their necessity for coherent thought and added that ordi-
narily a "common core of meaning" justified the use of the same ru-
brics in different contexts.'3 In what follows I am attaching no legal
consequences to my characterization of particular rules or values as
"procedural" as opposed to "substantive." Rather I am proposing to
take seriously the "common core of meaning" involved in the dis-
tinction by asking whether there be some values predicated of pro-
cedural matters which resist substance-oriented manipulation. By "re-
sist" I mean no more than that such manipulation seems to demand
more than ordinary justification.
I ask the reader's indulgence for an excursion into the past, though
I promise a return to the considerations of current procedure. It is
useful to test our intuition about the substance-oriented manipulation
of procedure in a remote context where, hopefully, we may assume
a degree of unanimity among readers about substance. The first rough
sketch of my intuition thus emerges from four cases involving the
issue of whether particular persons were or were not slaves.
Robinson v. Smyth 16 was decided by the.English Court of Common
Pleas in 1799; it is short enough to reproduce in its entirety:
13. NV. CooK, supra note 12, at 163.
14. Id. at 157-59.
15. Id. at 161.
16. Robinson v. Smyth, 1 Bos. & Pul. 454, 126 Eng. Rep. 1007 (C.P. 1799), discussed in
Reisman, Accelerating Advisory Opinions: Critique and Proposal, 68 Am. J. INT'L L.
648, 666 (1974).
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Shepherd Serjt. moved to put off the trial in this case on account
of the absence of a material witness. He stated that the action was
brought for wages supposed to be due to the Plaintiff as a sea-
man, upon a voyage from the West Indies to London, and that
the defence to be established by the evidence of the absent wit-
ness, was that the Plaintiff was slave to the Defendant who had
paid a valuable consideration for him.
Sed per Curiam. This is an odious defence, to which the Court
will give no assistance. If the Defendant were to offer to put it
on the record, we should not give him a day's time. It is as much
a denial of justice as the plea of alien enemy, which is always
discouraged by the Court.
Shepherd took nothing by his motion.' 7
This case seems a most troubling one despite (or, rather, because
of) the admirable sentiment against slavery expressly stated as a ground
for the exercise of discretion. Yet it is not easy to articulate what it
is that is troublesome about the case. It is certainly not the result.
Indeed, one can easily contemplate a perfectly acceptable decision
reaching the same result:
Sed per curiam: It is notorious that seamen, without wages from
their voyage, are impoverished, incapable of awaiting the normal
measure of the pace of litigation. If that time is given the de-
fendant in this action it is unlikely that the plaintiff, with no
wages from his voyage, will be able to subsist without departing
again, thereby losing his claim. Under such circumstances, there
is less likelihood that injustice will be done by denying defendant's
motion than by granting it.
Shepherd took nothing by his motion.
This hypothetical version of Robinson answers a question about the
element of timing in litigation with a justification that contains at
least an implicit, generalizable principle about its uses. It is respon-
sive to the defendant's motion in precisely the terms in which the
motion is made. Thus it seems quite clear that the case is troublesome
because of the nature of the justification, a manipulation of a pro-
cedural component to an admirable (from our moral perspective)
substantive end. Needless to say, we would be at least as troubled by
a case in which the same procedural amenities were withheld from a
black person petitioning for freedom because the jurisdiction held
freedom suits in disfavor.
Having reached the conclusion that it is the (admirable) substantive
17. 1 Bos. & Pul. at 454, 126 Eng. Rep. at 1007.
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justification for the procedural step in Robinson that is troublesome
rather than the procedural step itself, we must concede that there are
many examples of substantive justification for procedural steps which
do not trouble us in the same way. Indeed, the next three opinions
from the slavery area are, to a greater or lesser extent, justifiable in-
stances of such manipulations.
Within a month of Robinson, the Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals considered a question of standing in Pleasants v. Pleasants;s the
issue was whether to permit a person who had already been discharged
as executor of an estate to petition a court of equity in order to com-
pel legatees to free slaves who had passed to them under a will. The
will directed the beneficiaries to set the slaves free "when the laws
should allow of it." The Virginia Act of 1782, permitting manumis-
sion, was passed after the executor had been discharged. The Virginia
court allowed the petitioner to present the slaves' claims to freedom,
despite its certainty that he did so neither in his capacity as executor
nor as heir at law. The court permitted the discharged executor, son
of one testator and brother of the other, to represent the claim for
freedom:
On mature consideration, I am of opinion, that the suit in Chan-
cery cannot be sustained upon the ground of the appellee's [Robert
Pleasants's] claim as heir at law to take the slaves for the condition
broken, it being the practice of that Court to relieve against for-
feitures and not to aid or enforce them. Neither will his claim,
as executor, have that effect; because, having long since assented
to the several legacies and bequests of these people, he had fully
executed his power over the subject. At the same time, those
characters furnish a commendable reason for his stating the case
of these paupers to the Court; and it ought to be heard and de-
cided upon without a rigid attention to strict legal forms, since
it can be done, without material injury to the other parties.'9
Although this case presented what might be called a question of
standing, it is not the sort of standing issue involved in many chal-
lenges to administrative action which, as Professor Albert has demon-
strated, collapses into the question of whether the petitioner has a
claim for relief.20 Nor is the claim one of ius tertii, since Pleasants
18. 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 6 Va. (2 Call 2d ed.) 270 (1799), discussed in context in R.
COVER, JUSTICE AccusED: ANTISLAVERY & THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) [hereinafter cited as
JUSTICE ACCUSED].
19. 6 Va. (2 Call) at 350, 6 Va. (2 Call 2d ed.) at 294 (separate opinion of Pendleton, J.).
20. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974).
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suffered no injury and sought no relief for himself. Rather the holding
in Pleasants may be functionally equivalent to judicial ratification of
a self-appointment as guardian ad litem. Unquestionably the power
given him to bring the suit was extraordinary, and would not be gen-
eralized to parallel situations outside the area of slavery. My intuitive
sense of approval for Pleasants is fully as strong as my sense of dis-
approval for Robinson.
My third example is Hudgins v. Wright, decided by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in 1806.21 The issue was to whom a pre-
sumption of freedom would attach: To whites only? To Indians and
whites? Or to blacks, Indians and whites? The Chancellor of Virginia,
George Wythe, ruled that the presumption, derived from the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, should attach to all men regardless of race.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling as to Indians, the
only plaintiffs before the court, but explicitly reversed Wythe's dictum
as to blacks, stating that the presumption of freedom did not apply
to them. Hudgins raises the question of whether a counter-probabilis-
tic rebuttable presumption ought to be used to effectuate substantive
preferences. The Supreme Court of Appeals seemed to analyze the
question in terms of the conformity of the presumption to probable
fact in each instance, finding that it was likely to be probative as to
Indians but not as to blacks.22 My reaction to Wythe's audacious pre-
sumption is one of awe and approval mixed with a faintly troubled
echo of Robinson.
Finally, consider the United States Supreme Court case of Mima
Queen v. Hepburn,23 more particularly, Justice Duvall's dissenting
argument. Plaintiffs, Negroes held in servitude, claimed descent from
a free maternal ancestor and sought to introduce hearsay of hearsay
to prove that fact. The lower court refused to admit such evidence
and the Court, per Chief Justice Marshall, affirmed. Marshall asserted
that whatever the rules governing admissibility of evidence might be,
they must be trans-substantive:
[T]he rule then, which the Court shall establish in this cause will
not, in its application, be confined to cases of this particular de-
scription, but will be extended to others where rights may depend
on facts which happened many years past.24
21. 11 Va. (I Hen. & M.) 133 (1806), discussed in JUSMcE Accus.D, supra note 18, at 51.
22. 11 Va. (I Hen. & M.) at 137-39.
23. Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813), discussed in Newmeyer,
On Assessing the Court in History: Some Comments on the Roper and Burke Articles, 21
STAN. L. REv. 540, 542 (1969).
24. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 295.
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Justice Duvall's dissent, the only one he wrote in 24 years on the
Court, contains both an argument from established hearsay principles
and an argument from the special favor he supposes freedom suits
ought to enjoy. He reports that the Maryland courts had admitted
such hearsay in freedom suits on "the same principle, upon which
it is admitted to prove a custom, pedigree and the boundaries of
land."25 But Duvall goes on to argue that the rationale for admission
of hearsay in freedom suits is still stronger since "[i]t will be univer-
sally admitted that the right to freedom is more important than the
right of property."26 He then considers the litigation plight of plain-
tiffs in freedom suits and concludes:
And people of color from their helpless condition under the
uncontrolled authority of a master, are entitled to all reasonable
protection. A decision that hearsay evidence in such cases shall
not be admitted, cuts up by the roots all claims of the kind, and
puts a final end to them, unless the claim should arise from a fact
of recent date, and such a case will seldom perhaps never, occur.27
I am horrified by the Supreme Court's failure to adopt Duvall's po-
sition.
My intuition about these four cases, which may or may not be
shared by readers, requires an attempt to explain why there is a strong
negative reaction to Robinson, why there is a strong positive reaction
to Duvall's position in Mima Queen, and why there is approval for
Pleasants and for Wythe's position in Hudgins. My response to the
latter two cases is itself substance-biased: That is, it seems to me that
a supposed contrary result in Pleasants or the actual reversal of Wythe
in Hudgins would be acceptable in their own terms and troublesome
to some small extent only in their failure to further the substantive
preference I have against slavery.
Robinson seems to me to sit outside the limits of continuum of
more to less acceptable manipulations of process. It is thus particu-
larly important to understand what is disturbing in it. The difficulty
seems to me fourfold. First, the case seems to further no consistent,
coherent substantive policy, given what is presumed to be the operative
rule of law to be applied. Since slavery is presumed to be an acceptable
defense to the action for wages, we are confronted by the use of process
as a means of undermining the formal rule of law. Now qualification
25. Id. at 298.
26. Id. at 298-99.
27. Id. at 299.
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or mitigation of substance through process is not unusual or necessarily
problematic. But it usually takes the form of imposing presumptions
or allocating burdens to structure the usual litigation risks of uncer-
tainty in a fashion which recognizes a substantive preference. What
is highly unusual about Robinson is that it ignores this route alto-
gether in undermining the rule of law; it purposefully refuses to per-
mit uncertainty to be reduced. And it does so without any reference
to cost or efficiency criteria which may, in many situations, acceptably
impose a limit on the amount of trouble or expense we are prepared
to undertake to reduce uncertainty. 28
The only sensG that can be made of the combination of the substan-
tive rule of law in this case with the procedural ruling and its ar-
ticulated justification is that slavery is to be formally recognized, but
the holding of this form of interest is to be purposefully rendered in-
secure. It might be noted that this kind of objective, if it can be
justified at all, is usually justified as a "transition" stage in the de-
velopment of substantive law. 29 It suggests a position of disequilibrium
which, when resolved, will eventuate in a more stable substantive con-
figuration that will presumably not need, and should not use, such
manipulation of procedural components to achieve its ends. In a sense
this type of justification is itself a recognition of the character of the
process as a departure from a norm, as problematic.
The second disturbing characteristic of Robinson inheres in its
failure to achieve equality of treatment of litigants. Recall that my
suggested alternative to the court's opinion would have justified the
decision by invoking the litigation plight of impoverished seamen. It
would have stressed that the extension of time sought would unfairly
and disproportionately burden the other litigant, thus providing a gen-
eralizable, trans-substantive principle which would presumably benefit
and burden parties regardless of their positions on the matter before
the court.
The third problem in Robinson inheres in the unpredictable char-
acter of the justification when applied to process. That a claim or
defense is "disfavored" does not generate any plausible or predictable
pattern of impact on process.30 If the "disfavored" rubric will justify
28. For a cost-benefit framework of analysis for evaluating procedure, see R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 333-56 (1973); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Pro-
cedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
29. For a similar explanation of "fictions," see, e.g., L. FULLER, LEGAL FIcnONS 56-74
(1972); F. MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 373-74.
30. A frequent consequence of characterizing an action as disfavored has been more
stringent pleading. In going far beyond this without adequate justification, Robinson
suggests no stopping place.
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failure to extend time to secure an absent witness, it may, but need
not, eventuate in a predilection to dismiss pleadings for trivial errors,
a careful scrutiny of testimony for trivial inconsistencies, an enlarge-
ment of privileges to exclude testimony which would support the
disfavored claim, a narrowing of privilege to permit testimony against
the disfavored claim, etc. Indeed, the sum effect of calling an action
disfavored seems to be that lightning may strike at any time or in
any way; we know only which party it will strike.
Finally, Robinson is troublesome because the court chooses to make
a point of the lack of procedural justification for the decision. There
are a broad variety of procedural desiderata and a decision often in-
volves a choice among them. While a decision such as the one I suggest
as an acceptable alternative implicitly sets off one procedural value
against another, the Court of Common Pleas expressly failed to do so.
It may be justifiable, once a trade-off between process values is in-
evitable, to make the choice in one direction rather than another be-
cause of the substantive end that will thereby be served; in any event,
such a form of decision appears less nakedly as a disregard for a process
value. But it seems intuitively troublesome to ignore these values
altogether.
The other three cases considered above present fewer difficulties
of exposition than did Robinson. In Pleasants the court is confronted
with a problem of remote participatory rights, the issue of access to
litigation for those against or for whom a decree will not run. Indeed,
one may go further in terms of our present rules governing partici-
pation and stress that Pleasants himself would have neither been in-
jured nor benefited as a practical matter if his participation had been
denied. The conferral of rights of participation upon those whose
interest is remote or, in a sense, gratuitous, must represent in large
part a judgment about the likelihood of a particular form of litiga-
tion taking place without such participation, and about the desir-
ability of encouraging such litigation. It is difficult to imagine how
such judgments can be made in a trans-substantive fashion. One might
wish to encourage litigation in order to deter a certain kind of con-
duct (by structuring litigation risks and making adverse results more
likely) or in order to protect a certain class of persons considered par-
ticularly vulnerable to some specified form of predatory conduct. But
those judgments must be made on an individual basis for each sub-
stantive question.
Apart from substantive preferences, it is difficult to decide what
conditions will determine a decision to permit such remote partici-
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pation. But the concept of litigation plights and the likely conse-
quences of permitting participation may furnish some of these. Those
conditions could indeed be embodied in a rule which might read:
A person not seeking relief on behalf of himself or herself will be
permitted to seek relief on behalf of others if:
(a) There is reason to believe that those persons on behalf of whom
relief is sought are unable or substantially less able to seek relief
effectively on their own behalf.
(b) The representative party will actively and adequately represent
the interest of those on behalf of whom he sues.
(c) Effective adjudication on the merits will not be impeded.
But such a rule would be inadequate if it did not also permit con-
sideration of the effect of enhanced remote participation on the sub-
stantive objectives of whatever scheme is being enforced.
Thus in Pleasants one may discern two dimensions to the court's
decision. One dimension concerns itself with the procedural variables:
The form of litigation determined by Pleasants's petition serves the
end of effective litigation on the merits; the persons on behalf of whom
relief is sought are indeed in a vulnerable litigation situation; the
prior position of the petitioner as executor under the will is ground
for expecting adequate representation. But without the sense that there
is public favor for encouraging and facilitating private manumission
(a sense which pervades the opinions in Pleasants) there is no suffi-
cient reason for not leaving the matter to action by those aggrieved.
In a precisely analogous case the Supreme Court of North Carolina
refused to give leave to a discharged executor to sue.3' And that deci-
sion was quite proper given that court's express judgment that the sub-
stantive policy of the state was not hospitable to the creation of a
class of free Negroes through private manumission. Thus it seems to
me that questions of remote participatory rights and representation
will always involve a series of trans-substantive values which create
conditions for conferring such rights, but must also involve judgments
that cannot be made without particularized attention to their effect
upon substantive policy.
Hudgins v. Wright involved a rule allocating a burden or directing
an inference. What appears mildly problematic in procedural terms
about Chancellor Wythe's extension of the presumption of freedom
to blacks is that the vast majority of blacks in Virginia at the time
31. Pride v. Pulliam, 11 N.C. (4 Hawks) 49, 60 (1825).
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were slaves. In reversing Wythe, the Supreme Court of Appeals focused
on the failure of the presumption to accord with probable fact. Now
it is clear that presumptions and allocations of burdens ordinarily con-
form to probabilities in some sense; McCormick 32 gives justifications
for virtually all presumptions that include both some policy prefer-
ence and assessments of probability. However, as commentators have
often remarked with respect to the presumption of innocence, certain
"presumptions" are really initial allocations of the burden of uncer-
tainty. And, given the ordinary degree of uncertainty which is involved
in litigated matters, some assessment of the consequences of uncertainty
must be made. It is plausible and indeed intuitively compelling that
one will wish to be more certain about some matters before imposing
consequences when the consequences are particularly serious to one
of the parties. The presumption of innocence, with its attendant stand-
ard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then, is not really related to
probability. Rather it is a judgment that one wishes to be more than
usually certain before imposing consequences, and, that in the absence
of such more than usual certainty, one wishes to treat persons as in-
nocent. Similar statements might be made concerning the presumption
of freedom for which Wythe argued. That presumption is not a rule
of inference based on probable fact, but a starting point for allocation
of risks of uncertainty. It seems in no way offensive to concede that it
is more probable than not that a black person is a slave in the Virginia
of 1806 while yet asserting that the consequences of the characteriza-
tion of "slave" are so serious that one wishes to be more certain of
such fact than is permitted by a sense of general probability based on
race. It seems impossible to conceive of a manner of allocating the
risks of uncertainty without considering substantive preferences. A
general rule conforming allocations solely to probability flies in the
face of our sense that one wants to be more certain when consequences
are sufficiently serious.33
Our fourth case, Mima Queen, involved a still different form for
32. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 343-46, at 806-33 (2d ed. 1972); see 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2491, at 288-90 (1940).
33. This conclusion may be buttressed by a particular aversion to permitting race
(and/or other "suspect" categories) to be used as the medium for assessing negative con-
sequences. But the argument against using suspect categories in this manner is essentially
a modern development, and is less general than the argument developed above. A some-
what more difficult process issue would be presented if Wythe's statement were read to
mean that decisionmaking could not consider race as probative of slave status in light of
the probability that a black person was a slave (around 1806 in Virginia). No doubt
Virginia statute law intimated a requirement for documentary evidence in some kinds of
cases; but in the normal situation, no such preference could be plausibly read into the
law. The exclusion of the possibility of consideration of race would become, as in
Robinson, a purposeful procedural move to keep uncertainty from being reduced.
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the introduction of substantive preferences. We acknowledged a trans-
substantive value of reliability which was furthered by the general
hearsay rule. We also acknowledged, however, the likely existence of
certain litigation plights which were the inevitable consequence of
an unrelaxed application of the rule. As Justice Duvall pointed out,
the plight of petitioners for freedom such as Mima Queen consti-
tuted an instance of such an unenviable plight. But the issue of whether
to relieve such petitioners of that problem may well and properly in-
volve trading off the disutility of "improperly" adjudicating someone
a slave because no evidence save hearsay exists as to the freedom of
an ancestor against the disutility of possible incorrect adjudications
of freedom on the basis of unreliable evidence. 34 The availability-
reliability tension is a common one between two process goals.
A brief summary of the positions assumed thus far may be in order.
First, there is something problematic about manipulation of a pro-
cedural component to undermine the ostensible and articulated rule
of law; it appears as a purposeful, result-oriented refusal to permit
process to play its accustomed role of reducing uncertainty with no
countervailing procedural objective to justify that refusal. Second, be-
yond the basic participatory rights of those immediately affected by
outcomes, scope of litigation can be determined only with respect to
substantive goals. Purposeful manipulation of the scope of participa-
tion to achieve substantive ends is permissible and appropriate. But
there is additional force to the argument to expand remote participa-
tory rights where the litigation plight of a potential litigant is espe-
cially vulnerable. That plight and our reaction to it may be (but need
not necessarily be) related to our substantive preferences and values.
Third, the consequences of uncertainty and the characteristics that
certainty need attain before it is satisfactory to assess consequences
are substance-related. It is in no sense offensive to my intuition that
a single factor be or not be considered sufficient to support an in-
ference even if that decision be made in a patently counter-probabil-
istic fashion. This intuition is simply a part of my somewhat broader
sense that there are some consequences which entail a desire to be
more certain about our premises than the single factor inference
would warrant. Fourth, it is likewise permissible and possibly desirable
to consult our substantive preferences when trading off reliability
against availability of evidence.
34. Insofar as the exceptions to the hearsay rule relate to rational goals, they are
largely representative of this trade-off.
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In all four cases procedural devices are justified partially in terms
of substantive objectives. And since we approve of these objectives,
we might even find the failure to promote them (in at least three of
the cases) more troublesome than their separation from procedural
questions. What happens to our ability to further substantive goals
in similar situations when procedural norms are codified in a trans-
substantive structure is the subject of the next section of this article.
t III
The fine tuning of remedial and procedural instruments for im-
plementing substantive preferences which I have suggested was at
work in the slavery cases is severely retarded once procedural norms
are codified in a trans-substantive structure. Professor Moore's great
achievement-the continued viability, efficacy and, indeed, excellence
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-seems all the more remark-
able when one realizes that the river of litigation constantly erodes
the architecture of process-oriented codes, leaving us with its case law
incidents of application. It is extraordinary that our legal system holds
a divided view of procedure: Our norms for minimal process, ex-
pressed in the constitutional rubric of procedural due process, are
generally conceded to constitute a substance-sensitive calibrated con-
tinuum in which the nature of the process due is connected to the
nature of the substantive interest to be vindicated; 35 yet our primary
set of norms for optimal procedure, the procedure available in our
courts of general jurisdiction, is assumed to be largely invariant with
substance.3" It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural
needs of a complex antitrust action, a simple automobile negligence
case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an environmental
class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are sufficiently iden-
tical to be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which makes
virtually no distinctions among such cases in terms of available proc-
35. Thus if the interest protected is a possessory interest in a disputed chattel, the
process due may involve nothing more than a hasty judicial oversight of an affidavit,
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); if the interest is continued receipt of
social benefits, the process due will depend on the importance or nature of the benefits
and may require some sort of hearing, notice, opportunity to present one's case and to
confront adverse witnesses. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring
relatively elaborate process for termination of welfare benefits), with Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (upholding much less formal procedures for termination of government
employment).
36. There are certainly exceptions to this principle. Certain Federal Rules are cx-
plicitly related to special substantive areas. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (shareholders'
derivative actions); FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (pleading fraud, mistake or states of mind). Other
rules necessarily require incorporation of substantive law in their application, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 14 (standard of "is or may be liable to").
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ess.37 My point is not that the Federal Rules are not workable over
such a broad range. But it may be worth asking in what sense that
codification works well because of its trans-substantive aspiration, and
in what sense it works in spite of it. While a comprehensive catalogue
of the problems and advantages of generality in our code of procedure
is not possible in this article, notation of a few outstanding problems
which bear some resemblance to the cases I have discussed above
may well demonstrate the value of such an inquiry.
A. The Limits of Generality: Remote Participatory
Rights in the Contemporary Setting
In recent years courts have had to consider a modest variety of
schemes which can permit or encourage the participation of litigants
whose interests are remote or who seek to represent interests not their
own. Some of these cases have involved the class action and have re-
quired construction of Federal Rule 23.38 Others have involved the
construction of Federal Rule 24 governing intervention. 9 But many
cases which present issues of this sort have not arisen under particular
federal rules. Instead, the remedial structures invoked have either
been relatively novel or remotely analogous to common law and
equitable rubrics.40 Both construction of the Federal Rules and crea-
tion of new remedies would seem equally susceptible to the input
of substantive preferences along the lines suggested in Pleasants.
The class action has constituted the most widely noted and most
problematic case for construction of the Federal Rules. Commentators
could hardly fail to note the variety of contexts in which the remedial
clout purchased by the class action has far-reaching effects on sub-
stantive law. Some, like Milton Handler, have argued for a cautious
approach to the application of the Rule to antitrust laws because of
the inhibiting effect on legitimate business activity of both the in-
creased likelihood of private litigation and the possibility of enormous
37. It is clear that certain basic distinctions have already permeated the application
of the Federal Rules, though ordinarily not found within the text of the Rules them-
selves. For example, the use of the pretrial conference is largely directed to encouragement
of settlement in most routine actions. But in "big" or "complex" actions, the conference(s)
is (are) directed to planning future stages, whether trial or discovery.
38. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); In re Antibiotic Anti-
trust Action, 333 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Handler, The Shift front Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967);
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.
1972).
40. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. (Cal.), 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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recoveries. 41 Others have argued that the private class action should
be embraced precisely because it is a form of private enforcement,
which may well be more efficient and cheaper in deterring unwanted
and illegal activity than public enforcement. 42 But with the single
significant exception of truth in lending cases, 43 courts have not an-
alyzed class action cases as presenting problematic questions of sub-
stantive law: of antitrust, securities regulation or environmental policy.
Rather, they have treated the text of the trans-substantive rule as more
or less controlling on the issue of its availability. 44
Some opponents of the class action have argued that it is precisely
the characteristics noted above that make application of the rule prob-
lematic under the Rules Enabling Act, a statute which provides that
the rules not "abridge, enlarge or modify" substantive rights of par-
ties.45 The first section of this article leads to the conclusion that the
manipulation of procedural tools to effectuate substantive objectives
is by no means undesirable and often seems necessary. Thus if the
Enabling Act were read to forbid a Federal Rule to have substantive
impact, it would create an anomaly. Federal Rules, intended to pro-
vide a flexible structure for achieving substantive ends, would remove
from the courts a useful arsenal for remedial policy by freezing process
in a single posture for all cases. But there is a way of reading the
Enabling Act which neither renders it a dead letter, as courts have
tended to do, nor construes it as a bulwark against change. Such a
41. See Handler, supra note 38, at 5-12.
42. See, e.g., Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, 9: Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LE.AL STuDIEs 1, 14 n.18 (1974).
43. The truth in lending cases have been a partial exception largely because the $100
minimum recovery per violation can be and has been read as inconsistent with the
multiplier effect of 23(b)(3) class actions. These cases began to take a strange turn with
the significant opinions of Judge Marvin Frankel in Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y.
Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). For recent cases and developments, see Note,
Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410 (1974); Note, Recent
Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 101 (1974).
44. The epitome of such reasoning is Eisen II, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555 (2d Cir. 1968). The subsequent reversal of direction in this case is noteworthy for
continued failure to take into account substantive justifications or lack of them for the
use of this remedy. There is a noteworthy difference in approach to this issue of sub-
stalnce-oriented justification for use of the class action between the two leading federal
practice treatises. Professor Moore is characteristically concerned with the subordination
of procedure to substance. In interpreting the provision of Rule 23(b)(3) that the class ac-
tion be found "'superior to other available methbds for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy'" citing Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), Professor
Moore states that this requirement "involves continuous awareness of the consequences
for substantive rights which follow from decisions on procedural matters." Moore adds:
"An important substantive issue which the court must face in assessing the superiority of
a class suit in a (b)(3) situation is the desirability of using this procedural mechanism to
encourage litigation, in each particular case." 3A J. MooRE, supra note 10, f 23.45[3], at
23-801 to 02. Contrast the absence of such substance sensitivity in the treatment of the
same issue in 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MLLER, supra note 10, § 1779, at 57-64.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
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reading would start with the premise suggested above, that absent a
trans-substantive structure of rules, courts must often justify decisions
about procedure with a combination of substantive and procedural
objectives and values. The Rules Enabling Act might then be read to
mean that the courts, in applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or any subsequently enacted similar body of rules, may not forsake
their responsibility to justify substantive impact in terms of substan-
tive values. It would not be enough to point to Rule 23; one would
have to justify invoking it.46
The Rules Enabling Act, then, would operate to render explicit the
obligation of the courts to make the same sort of determination when
applying Federal Rules or similar codifications as they would make
when justifying a form of non-rule remedy such as equitable relief.
Insofar as the application of the federal rule to the particular area
were not well-established, it would require the degree of elaborate
inquiry into substantive objectives which marked the Supreme Court's
discussion of non-rule remedies in cases like J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,47
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI,48 Brown v. Board
of Education (I1) 41 and Hawaii v. Standard Oil.50 Insofar as the gen-
eral applicability of the federal rule to the substantive area were well-
established, the inquiry would center on the utility of its specific in-
cidence. Above all, the Rules Enabling Act would not be read to forbid
the application of a federal rule because it altered substantive rights.
However, it would forbid the reasoning by which a rule altered the
right simply because it is a rule of procedure. As part of the repository
of our collective procedural imagination the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would be read to include remedial structures which could
be applied where appropriate in light of substantive objectives.
At this point it is well to consider the argument that the Rules,
as a quasi-legislative enactment, should restrict the courts in much the
same way as statutes should. In this view, however desirable it is for
courts to exercise a residual power to manipulate all process norms
(including Rules) to achieve substantive objectives, they no longer
have the power to make such decisions as to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The answer to such an argument is twofold. First,
remedial creativity is exercised apart from the Federal Rules, and
46. It may well be that one dimension of such a justification would involve an
acknowledgment of the character of "mass production" transactions, a quality which may
be common in many different substantive areas. Hazard, supra note 2, at 308-09.
47. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
48. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
49. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
50. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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the extension of that creativity to application of the Federal Rules
is not inherently beyond the power of a court. In imposing a limita-
tion on the power to alter substantive rights through the Federal Rules,
Congress was not concerned with the danger of explicit remedial crea-
tivity accompanied by substance-oriented justifications. Rather it was
concerned lest the power granted to regulate procedure enlarge the
power of the courts to make substantive law. So long as courts make
explicit their substance-oriented justifications for procedural steps, they
will place themselves in precisely the same position they occupy with
respect to (nonconstitutional) questions of standing, equitable relief,
or any other remedial characteristic. Congress will know what choice
was made and will be able to correct it or not as it chooses. Moreover,
the problematic character of the Federal Rules under the Constitution
must color our treatment of them as controlling. They are not passed
by Congress, but are promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
Justices Black and Douglas have long dissented from promulgation
on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of that procedure. If the
Federal Rules are to be read as removing the power of a court to
treat substantive objectives as overriding where they otherwise would
control, have they not "abridged, modified or enlarged" substantive
law in a fashion more far-reaching than some outcome-determinative
test would suggest?
B. The Problem of Ad Hoc Application
The model of decisionmaking under the Federal Rules that I have
suggested hardly constitutes a cure-all for our procedural ills. For in
the past several years the application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to federal habeas corpus actions has worked along just such
a model with, at best, mixed results. Far from precluding use of tools
such as interrogatories for purposes of discovery, the Supreme Court
has simply turned the question into one of case-by-case determination
of whether the needs of effective adjudication of the particular issue
warrant the use of such a tool. In Harris v. Nelson,51 the Court stated:
We conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a district court,
confronted by a petition for habeas corpus which establishes a
prima facie case for relief, may use or authorize the use of suit-
able discovery procedures, including interrogatories, reasonably
fashioned to elicit facts necessary to help the court to "dispose
of the matter as law and justice require." 52
51. 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
52. Id. at 290.
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Most important for our purposes is the Court's reasoning concerning
the source of authority for discovery, such as it may be, in habeas
corpus:
Clearly, in these circumstances [the absence of specific congres-
sional guidance on methods of "securing facts"], the habeas corpus
jurisdiction and the duty to exercise it being present, the courts
may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to exist-
ing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage ...
Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651. This statute has served since its inclusion, in sub-
stance, in the original Judiciary Act as a "legislatively approved
source of procedural instruments designed to achieve 'the rational
ends of law.' 53
Justice Harlan's dissent in Harris, though prompted by his satisfac-
tion on the record that the discovery sought in the instant case was
not necessary to a fair hearing, also raised in stark form the difficulty
inherent in a case-by-case approach to procedure.
If discovery procedures are developed case by case, there will at
least be a very long period during which procedures will differ
from district to district. . . . It is unlikely that the rules thus
generated will be the best that could have been devised.54
As a result, Harlan concluded that the model of "rules" setting con-
sistent and coherent standards ought to be invoked in the establish-
ment of a code of habeas corpus rules of procedure. 55 But Harlan's
suggestion of referring the habeas procedure question to a Rules Ad-
visory Committee was followed with ironic results: The proposed
Habeas Rules (now nearly two years old with no action taken) refer
the question of discovery to the discretion of the court for case-by-case
treatment along the lines suggested by the Court in Harris.50
In some sense Harlan has certainly been proven correct. One can-
not re-invent a procedural system for every case. And the question
of what is to be presumptively or generally available may be best set-
tled by rule. But where the only or primary issues at stake are sub-
stantive, justifications in substantive terms may be necessary.
53. Id. at 299.
54. Id. at 306.
55. Id.
56. Habeas Corpus Rule 6, § 2255 Rule 6, in CoMM. ON RULES OF PRACICE AND
PROCEDURE, AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES
GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS, PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS
FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 62,113 (1973).
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Sero v. Preiser,5 7 a recent application of the method of Harris v.
Nelson, is an example. In that case the Second Circuit upheld a ha-
beas corpus class action on behalf of "more than 500" New York
state prisoners who had received special four year sentences as young
adults for misdemeanors which would have entailed shorter sentences
if treated as adult crimes. The places and conditions of confinement
for those "young adult" (16 to 21 years old) offenders were the same
as for adult offenders.
In upholding the class action the court grounded its authority in
the All Writs Act and found the content of its procedural tool by
analogy to Rule 23. But it went further:
A number of other persuasive justifications enforce our conclu-
sion that the class action was appropriately used in this case. Be-
cause many of those serving reformatory sentences are likely to
be illiterate or poorly educated, and since most would not have
the benefit of counsel to prepare habeas corpus petitions, it is not
improbable that more than a few would otherwise never receive
the relief here sought on their behalf.5s
This invocation of the litigation plight of young, poor prisoners is
highly reminiscent of the justification for the holding in Pleasants
and for Justice Duvall's dissent in Mima Queen.
Why, indeed, may the All Writs Act (or alternatively, some notion
of a residual constitutional power of a court) not be read to provide
the same flexibility of process for ordinary civil actions to which the
Federal Rules apply as that provided for habeas corpus? The signifi-
cance of that question may be demonstrated by contrasting Sero with
the opinion of the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin."°
In Eisen the Court, eschewing constitutional grounds for its decision,
ruled that actual notice must be sent to all known or readily ascertain-
able class members in a 23(b)(3) action, even if the cost of such notice
would be so high as effectively to preclude the action being brought.
The Court grounded its opinion in the language of Federal Rule
23(c)(2):
[T]he Court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort.
57. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974).
58. Id. at 1126.
59. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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Eisen is remarkable for its absolute silence on the issue of the im-
pact that this ruling would have on substantive issues of antitrust and
securities law enforcement. Instead of considering a vague term, "prac-
ticable," as an invitation to inject substantive preferences, the Court
treats the Rules notice provision as a clear legislative command which
is binding and susceptible to only one resolution. I must stress that
my criticism of Eisen does not go to the result. It may be eminently
reasonable (though I doubt it) to refrain from the use of such a pro-
cedural device in terms of antitrust policy. But it seems absurd to re-
frain from a remedy which may make sense in substantive terms be-
cause of lack of individualized notice to persons who cannot conceiv-
ably be harmed thereby as a practical matter. In Eisen both economic
considerations and the statute of limitations made it a virtual cer-
tainty that no individual actions would conceivably be brought if the
class action failed. Thus a class member would lose no viable litigation
opportunity even if notice failed to reach him, while the defendants'
securing of a res judicata bar would constitute no better barrier to
subsequent law suits than that afforded by cost barriers to individual
suits and the statute of limitations.
If the All Writs Act may serve as a repository of power to create
the process needed by a particular case or substantive interest, absent
a rule or body of rules, why could it not serve equally to provide a
basis for modification of rules where they do exist? Such a scheme
would neither destroy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor violate
some notion of separation of powers. Indeed, just as Sero and Harris
have hardly shaken the normal presumption that habeas corpus peti-
tioners' actions will have no recourse to discovery or class actions, so
an application of the All Writs creative power to modify the Federal
Rules in extraordinary circumstances such as Eisen would not alter
the presumptive applicability of the Rules as they stand. As to separa-
tion of powers, I have already argued that the most problematic char-
acter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the Rules En-
abling Act emerges from letting the mere fact of a rule's existence
control the promotion (or lack thereof) of substantive values. The use
of the All Writs Act to implement substantive values is simply a device
for avoiding such a bind.
Professor James Wm. Moore has always envisioned the Federal Rules
as a tool which embodies a practical philosophy of procedure, one
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which liberates the courts to achieve substantive ends. From his in-
sistence in 1935 with Judge Clark that the Federal Rules break
through outmoded categories which no longer served substantive ob-
jectives to his very recent insistence that we break through the shib-
boleth of jurisdiction, 60 the contemporary counterpart of the forms of
action, Professor Moore has persistently struggled against the elevation
of form over substance. I think he will agree that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, themselves, ought never to become the categories to
which substance must bend. Indeed, he might prefer to find his source
for this perspective not in the All Writs Act, but in the text of the
Federal Rules themselves, in the oft-quoted but little used authority
of Rule 1: "They [the Rules] shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
60. Moore & Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System to Meet
the Needs of a Complex Society, I FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1973).
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